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Sunk-cost fallacy

The sunk-cost fallacy lets unrecoverable past spending drive a new decision. Compare future incremental value while preserving opportunity costs, new evidence and exit consequences.

The sunk-cost fallacy is allowing an unrecoverable past expenditure of money, time or effort to favour continuing an activity when that expenditure cannot be changed by today's choice. In quantitative research, “we have already spent months on this strategy” can become a reason to fund another test even when its prospective value no longer justifies its prospective cost.

A sunk cost describes the expenditure. The fallacy describes how it influences the decision. Neither a disappointing project nor persistence by itself establishes the bias.

The research bill and the next test

A fictional team has already spent USD 10,000 developing a signal. That payment is irrecoverable. A further test would cost USD 2,000 and deliver an estimated USD 1,500 of incremental gross benefit. Treat the benefit as an expected money value that includes any useful future learning or option value. Suppose stopping has no further cost or benefit, and there are no refunds, saleable assets, taxes or exit costs that differ between the choices. All future amounts are expressed at today's value.

Under this deliberately risk-neutral comparison,

Expected incremental net value=1,500−2,000=−500 USD.\text{Expected incremental net value}=1{,}500-2{,}000=-500\ \text{USD}.

Stopping has incremental value zero. Continuing is therefore USD 500 worse in expected-money terms under the stated assumptions. The USD 10,000 does not make another USD 2,000 attractive merely because stopping would feel like wasting the original research.

Fictional research decision in USD: an unrecoverable past cost of 10,000 is common to both choices. Continuing has expected benefit 1,500 less further cost 2,000, giving minus 500; stopping has zero future incremental value.
Fictional research decision in USD: an unrecoverable past cost of 10,000 is common to both choices. Continuing has expected benefit 1,500 less further cost 2,000, giving minus 500; stopping has zero future incremental value.
Original fictional decision ledger. The comparison starts today; the past bill is unchanged under either choice. Assumes no resale, refund, exit cost or tax difference, with future learning value included in the benefit estimate.

Including the historical bill in both histories gives expected cumulative net amounts of minus USD 10,500 for continuing and minus USD 10,000 for stopping. Their difference is still minus USD 500. Removing a common past cost from the comparison does not erase the accounting loss; it identifies what this decision can change.

The conclusion depends on the forecast. If revised evidence instead supports USD 2,500 of incremental benefit with the same further cost, continuation has positive expected incremental value of USD 500. Continuing can be sensible after a large sunk expenditure. Its justification must come from what continuation offers now.

What belongs on the forward side

“Exclude sunk costs” is narrower than “ignore history.” Before excluding a number, ask whether today's alternatives can change its consequences.

ItemTreatment in today's comparison
An expired, non-refundable data licenceIts past fee is sunk. Evidence learned from its data can still change the forecast.
A refundable deposit or saleable serverThe amount recoverable now is relevant. Giving it up to continue creates an opportunity cost.
A researcher's next weekAlready completed hours are sunk; the value of the best alternative use of next week's time is not.
Closing a live strategyFuture liquidation costs, remaining obligations and risk during exit belong in the comparison.
Tax consequences of a saleInclude applicable future differences. A historical cost basis may determine them; it cannot simply be discarded.

The same care applies to a losing position. Its current resale value remains available capital, and holding it forgoes an alternative use of that capital. Original purchase price alone does not establish today's expected payoff. But transaction costs, portfolio exposures, constraints, taxes and new information may legitimately affect a hold-versus-exit comparison. Labelling a position a “loser” supplies none of those inputs and does not imply a trade instruction.

An expected value calculation also leaves model uncertainty unresolved. The team's USD 1,500 is an estimate, not an observed future receipt. Different plausible forecasts, funding constraints or risk preferences may change the ranking. If learning, strategic benefits or waiting options matter, value them explicitly rather than assuming they are either zero or automatically sufficient to justify continuing.

Evidence about the bias, and limits on the label

Arkes and Blumer's original study (1985), Experiment 1, used hypothetical non-refundable, non-resaleable ski tickets: many respondents preferred the more expensive trip despite expecting to enjoy the other one more. Experiment 2 randomly assigned theatre-ticket discounts; full-price buyers used more tickets in the first half of the season, but the groups did not differ significantly in the second half. Experiments 3–4 studied project continuation and success beliefs. These are specific experimental settings, not a prevalence estimate for quantitative traders.
The conceptual test is whether an unrecoverable expenditure changes the choice while the relevant prospective consequences are held fixed. In practice they often are not fixed: completed work can reveal useful information, create reusable assets or reduce the remaining effort. A manager's decision to continue is therefore insufficient evidence of a sunk-cost fallacy.
Loss aversion concerns sensitivity to losses relative to a reference point. The disposition effect describes a tendency to realise gains more readily than losses. Those ideas may help explain some persistence, but they are not synonyms for letting irrecoverable expenditure drive a new commitment.

A review that keeps the learning

A useful project review records the alternatives available now, their remaining costs and benefits, the evidence behind the estimates, and what would change the decision. Asking “would this next test be worth buying today, with the knowledge and assets we actually have?” removes the emotional claim on yesterday's budget without pretending the project started from nothing.

Keep the failed versions and research results. Their informational value can survive a decision to stop funding the strategy. The Drift, Decay and Retirement lesson develops the distinction between monitoring evidence, risk-control action and an orderly strategy exit. Its preview is public; the full lesson requires membership.

Sources

  • Arkes, H. R. and Blumer, C. (1985). The Psychology of Sunk Cost, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1), 124–140. Introduction and Experiments 1–4, pp. 124–130: definition, ticket choices, field evidence, project continuation and beliefs. The research-budget example and decision ledger above are original fictional constructions.
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  • sunk costs
  • behavioural finance
  • research decisions
  • strategy retirement
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